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The Recovery of “Criminal” Assets in New Zealand, Ireland and England: Fighting 
Organised and Serious Crime in the Civil Realm  
Liz Campbell* 
 
Abstract  
 
This article considers the recent introduction of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 
2009 in New Zealand, and compares it with the established processes of civil asset 
recovery in Ireland, England and Wales. Salient differences between the models are 
examined, including the more expansive definitions in Ireland. The paper posits that the 
recovery process in these three jurisdictions in fact is a criminal one which merits the 
adoption of due process rights, given the promotion of the aims of punishment, the 
centrality of the targeted individual’s culpability, and the powers of the agencies 
involved. However, the extant jurisprudence in Ireland and England has concluded that 
the process is civil: thus, perhaps the best that can be expected is the adoption of a 
“middle ground” approach, which encompasses protective rights while still operating in 
the civil sphere. 
 
Introduction 
 
Civil asset recovery has been used as a key mechanism to tackle organised and gangland 
criminality in Ireland, England and Wales for the past decade, and this tactic has recently 
been adopted in the New Zealand by means of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 
2009. The accrual of considerable wealth by criminals, coupled with the perceived 
inability of the existing legal framework to deal with this state of affairs, precipitated 
legislative action in this regard. While measures facilitating the confiscation of a 
convicted offender’s property were already in place in each of these jurisdictions,1 
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1
 See Proceeds of Crime Act 1991, section 15 (New Zealand); Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986, section 
1; Criminal Justice Act 1988, Part VI; Drug Trafficking Act 1994, section 43 (England and Wales); 
Criminal Justice Act 1994, sections 4, 9, 38 and 39 (Ireland).  
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property may now be seized and retained in the absence of a criminal conviction. These 
developments herald a fundamental revision of the means used to counter serious crime.  
 This area of law has been considered by numerous commentators: Peter Alldridge 
analysed the English approach comprehensively and alluded to Ireland briefly in so 
doing,
2
 further analysis of the Irish law is plentiful,
3
 and the potentially problematic 
aspects of the New Zealand model were highlighted prior to the 2009 Act’s enactment.4 
However, this article adopts an explicitly comparative stance, to present a pragmatic and 
normative assessment of the New Zealand approach based on the experience in Ireland 
and England. Some tentative legal and societal explanations are posited for the fact that 
the Irish approach predated its closest neighbour’s by a number of years. Moreover, the 
model in Ireland is more expansive in many definitional respects, thereby explaining its 
relative success, in terms of assets recouped. The extent to which the New Zealand model 
is informed by its precursors in England and Ireland will be analysed, and the potentially 
problematic aspects, in terms of individual rights, will be noted. It will be argued that the 
recovery process is truly a criminal one, which merits the adoption of protective due 
process rights. However, given the ineluctable conclusion of Irish, English and also 
European jurisprudence that the process is civil, it will finally be argued that perhaps the 
best that can be expected is the adoption of a “middle ground” jurisprudence, which 
encompasses protective rights while still operating in the civil sphere. 
 
Adapting to the threat of organised crime  
 
The rationale behind civil asset forfeiture lies in the apparent ability of leaders of 
organised crime gangs to distance themselves from detectable criminal behaviour by 
                                                 
2
 Peter Alldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal Laundering 
and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart, 2003), at 224 et seq. 
3
 John Meade, “Organised Crime, Moral Panic and Law Reform: the Irish Adoption of Civil Forfeiture” 
(2000) 10 Irish Criminal Law Journal 11; John Meade, “The Disguise of Civility: Civil Forfeiture of the 
Proceeds of Crime and the Presumption of Innocence in Irish Law” (2000) 1 Hibernian Law Journal 1; Liz 
Campbell, “Theorising Asset Forfeiture in Ireland” (2007) 71 Journal of Criminal Law 441; Paul 
McCutcheon and Dermot Walsh, “Seizure of Criminal Assets: An Overview” (1999) 9 Irish Criminal Law 
Journal 127; Shane Murphy, “Tracing the Proceeds of Crime: Legal and Constitutional Implications” 
(1999) 9 Irish Criminal Law Journal 160. 
4
 Peter Wright, “Criminal Punishment Without Civil Rights: The Criminal Proceeds And Instruments Bill’s 
Punitive Civil Sanctions” (2006) 37:4 VUW Law Review 623. 
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delegating responsibility for the implementation of illegal acts, thereby preventing 
prosecution in the conventional way. Also, the methods of perpetrating crime and of 
communicating by the “overlords” and “godfathers” of organised crime are seen as more 
advanced and impenetrable to law enforcement agencies.
5
 In the words of David Garland, 
the state is thus faced with a “criminological predicament” in which high crime rates are 
a normal social fact and the criminal justice process is ineffective, and so the state adapts 
to the “new reality” of crime control by employing measures such as civil forfeiture.6 
 This insulation of leaders of organised crime gangs from prosecution and their use 
of sophisticated tactics and means of communication was seen to warrant the adoption of 
a “radically new and thorough approach” which requires evidence only on the civil 
burden of proof.
7
 In the Irish Parliament it was stated that “[i]f traditional methods fail we 
must devise new ones.…. If we cannot arrest the criminals, why not confiscate their 
assets?”8 Similarly, the Attorney General in England and Wales stated that civil recovery 
“is needed to fill an important gap in the law”,9 while in the New Zealand Parliament it 
was claimed that the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 “is not working, so it is necessary to 
repeal it”,10 and that there was a need to be “a lot more creative as law drafters”.11 Such 
remarks encapsulate the rationale underpinning this adaptive response to the problem of 
organised crime. As the conventional means of criminal prosecution were deemed to be 
lacking, a new mechanism was devised which eases the burden on the state and facilitates 
the control of such criminality in a novel way, by pursuing the funds of gang leaders and 
so stifling future criminality; by removing negative role models; and by generating 
confidence in a fair and effective criminal justice system.
12
 
 
 
                                                 
 
5
 Dáil Debates, Vol.467, col.2473 (2 July 1996); Murphy v GM [2001] 4 IR 113, at 136. 
6
 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), at 105 et seq. 
7
 Seanad Debates, Vol.148, col.420 (27 June 1996); Murphy v GM, at 136. 
8
 Dáil Debates, Vol.467, col.2435 (2 July 1996). 
9
 Hansard (HL), Vol.635, col.71 (13 May 2002). 
10
 Hansard (NZ), Vol.653, p.2189 (31 March 2009) per Paul Quinn. 
11
 Ibid per Amy Adams.    
12
 Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit, Recovering the Proceeds of Crime (Cabinet Office, 
2000), at paras.1.3 and 1.10. 
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The Irish exemplar  
 
In Ireland, support for civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crime was expressed as far back 
as 1985 by the Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System and the Select Committee on 
Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism.
13
 Nevertheless, little further consultation or analysis 
was undertaken before the remarkably speedy introduction of legislation in the summer 
of 1996.
14
 The Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, which was proposed by Fianna Fáil (the 
main opposition party at the time) as a private member’s bill, was enacted within a mere 
five weeks. This action was prompted by the murders of police officer Jerry McCabe and 
investigative journalist Veronica Guerin in quick succession, expediting the enactment of 
two seminal statutes pertaining to civil asset recovery.
15
 As one member of Parliament 
insisted, if we “as a community [are] prepared to tolerate the continued unhindered 
existence in our midst of people who have accumulated vast and unexplained wealth 
…Veronica Guerin died in vain.”16  
The relevant legislation in England and Wales is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, 
following recommendations of the Home Office in 1998 and the Cabinet Office in 
2000.
17
 So, it may be seen that the civil forfeiture scheme in Ireland predated the English 
model by a number of years, in marked contrast to the traditional trend of policy transfer 
whereby Ireland emulates legal developments from its neighbouring jurisdiction (such as 
occurred recently, for example, regarding anti-social behaviour orders
18
). One possible 
reason for this lies in the fact that in the mid-1980s, a comparable measure was 
introduced in Ireland to combat subversive crime, such as that perpetrated by the Irish 
Republican Army (the IRA). It is likely that this legislative prototype provided significant 
                                                 
13
 Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System 
(Stationery Office, 1985); Select Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism, Sixth Report of the 
Select Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism: Confiscation of Assets Illegally Acquired 
Through Drug Trafficking (Stationery Office, 1985). 
14
 See John Meade, “Organised Crime, Moral Panic and Law Reform”, note 3, at 15.   
15
 In addition to the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 established the 
agency responsible for implementing the process of asset recovery.  
16
 Dáil Debates, note 5, col.2406 per John O’Donoghue. 
17
 Home Office Working Group on Confiscation, Third Report: Criminal Assets (Home Office, 1998); 
Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit, note 12. 
18
 Anti-social behaviour orders were introduced in England and Wales in the late 1990s in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998 (as amended by the Police Reform Act 2002), and were provided for in a modified form 
in Ireland in the Criminal Justice Act 2007. For an examination of the concept of policy transfer see Trevor 
Jones and Tim Newburn, Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice (Open University Press, 2007).   
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influence and legitimacy for the present mechanism, rather than, or at least in addition to, 
the oft-cited historical tradition of forfeiture
19
 and the contemporary US approach.
20
  
 The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985 was introduced in Ireland 
to facilitate the civil seizure and forfeiture of property of illegal organisations, thereby 
providing a useful example for the subsequent 1996 Act which has a broader remit. 
Indeed, that the 1985 Act would establish a framework for dealing with future cases of 
this nature was explicitly recognised in the legislature,
21
 where it was described as a 
“clear and direct precedent” for the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996.22 Section 2 of the 1985 
Act allowed the Minister for Justice to freeze monies held by a bank which he believed to 
be the property of an unlawful organisation
23
 and require them to be paid to the High 
Court, and this action was not dependent on the initiation of criminal proceedings. After a 
period of six months, the Minister could make an ex parte application to the High Court 
directing that the monies be paid to him, but any person claiming to be the owner of the 
property could also apply to have the monies paid to him, bearing the burden of proof to 
establish ownership.
24
 The 1985 Act was limited in its lifespan, as it was brought in on a 
temporary basis and operated for a mere three months unless continued in force by 
Government order, and was used in only one instance. 
 The subject of the order challenged the constitutionality of this scheme in Clancy 
v Ireland,
25
 where in a brief judgment, Barrington J concluded that the process amounted 
                                                 
19
 Traditionally, the value of an inanimate object which directly or indirectly caused the accidental death of 
a King’s subject was forfeited to the Crown; forfeiture resulted after conviction for felonies and treason; 
and admiralty forfeiture occurred after breach of maritime or customs law. For an examination of the 
history of asset forfeiture see Cecil Greek, “Drug Control and Asset Seizures: A Review of the History of 
Forfeiture in England and Colonial America” in Thomas Mieczkowski ed, Drugs, Crime and Social Policy 
(Allyn and Bacon, 1992), at 109-137. Also see Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing Co (1974) 416 US 
663, at 680 et seq.  
20
 The “RICO” provision (the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organisations, Title IX to the Organised 
Crime Control Act 1970, 18 USC 1961 § et seq), the most well-known of US forfeiture measures, was cited 
in the Irish legislature prior to the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996. Dáil Debates, Vol.467, 
cols.2372-2373 (July 2, 1996) per Bertie Ahern; col.2444 per Alan Shatter; and col.2473 per Willie O’Dea. 
See Jimmy Gurule, “Federal Asset Forfeiture Reform Introduction: The Ancient Roots of Modern 
Forfeiture Law” (1995) 21 Journal of Legislation 155.   
21
 Dáil Debates, Vol.356, col.132 (19 February 1985) per Minister for Justice, Michael Noonan. 
22
 Dáil Debates, note 5, col.2409 per John O’Donoghue. Also see col.2374 per Bertie Ahern and col.2473 
per Willie O’Dea.  
23
 Section 18 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939 proscribes seditious and subversive organisations, 
such as the Irish Republican Army (the IRA). 
24
 Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985, section 3.  
25
 Clancy v Ireland [1988] IR 326. 
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to a permissible delimitation of property rights in the interests of the common good, and 
was not in breach of fairness of procedures.
26
 He stated that the possibility of 
compensation and the right to apply to court for determination of ownership ensured 
constitutional compliance,
27
 and the inclusion of these two safeguards in the 1996 Act 
was later stressed in legislative debate.
28
 This decision of the Supreme Court proved 
pivotal in the introduction, and subsequent judicial approval, of the Irish Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1996.  
 The most recent introduction of civil recovery law is in New Zealand, by means 
of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009. This Bill was introduced in 2007, while 
the Act comes into force on 1 December 2009 and shares many aspects of the equivalent 
legislation in the British Isles. 
 
Comparing the Acts 
 
Many similarities exist between the asset forfeiture processes in Ireland, England and 
New Zealand. In the two former jurisdictions, civil orders may be made against property 
worth at least €13,000 in Ireland and £10,000 in England and Wales which are deemed to 
be the proceeds of crime, that is, obtained as a result of or in connection with the 
commission of an offence,
29
 or through unlawful conduct
30
 respectively. In New Zealand 
the property which may be recovered is that which is acquired or derived from 
“significant criminal activity”, which is behaviour that if proceeded against as a criminal 
offence would be punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years or more, 
or behaviour from which property or proceeds of a value of NZ$30,000 or more have 
been acquired or derived.
31
 It is not necessary for proceedings to have been brought for 
an offence in connection with the property,
32
 and particular proceeds need not be related 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, at 336. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Dáil Debates, note 5, col.2409 per John O’Donoghue.   
29
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 1.  
30
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 240(1). The Home Office suggested that this could be amended to 
include property retained by unlawful conduct, or “assets obtained by or in connection with unlawful 
conduct”. Home Office, Asset Recovery Action Plan: A Consultation Document (Home Office, 2007), at 
[3.4].    
31
 Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, section 6.  
32
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 240(2); Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, section 6(2). 
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to a particular crime on the basis that this would make the scheme “useless and 
unworkable”.33 Most significantly, the standard of proof required in all these schemes is 
the civil standard.
34
 This “enable[s] the lower probative requirements of civil law to be 
utilised in appropriate cases…to effectively deprive such persons of such illicit financial 
fruits of their labours as can be shown to be proceeds of crime.”35  
 Essentially, three civil orders may be brought against such property in Ireland, 
and England and Wales: interim, interlocutory and disposal orders, and freezing, interim 
receivership and recovery orders respectively. Interim orders in Ireland and freezing 
orders in England prevent a specified person from dealing with the property for a limited 
period, and they may be issued ex parte.
36
 The interlocutory order is the next stage in the 
process in Ireland, and is applied for within 21 days of the making of the interim order.
37
 
The court must make an interlocutory order
 
if evidence establishes that a person 
possesses or controls property which constitutes the proceeds of crime and is of the 
requisite value, unless this is refuted or if there would be a serious risk of injustice. This 
order’s equivalent in England and Wales is the interim receivership order, which prevents 
the person from dealing with the property, and is founded on “a good arguable case”38 
that the particular property is or includes recoverable property.
39
 As originally enacted, 
the Irish Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 allowed for the making of a disposal order where 
an interlocutory order had been in force for not less than seven years;
40
 now, disposal 
may occur after a shorter period when an application is made with the consent of the 
                                                 
33
 McK v F and H [2005] IESC 6; [2005] 2 IR 163, at [15]; Director of Assets Recovery Agency v Green 
[2005] EWHC 3168 (Admin); [2005] All ER (D) 261 at [17]; Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v 
Szepietowski [2007] EWCA Civ 766; [2007] All ER (D) 364, at [26]. 
34
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 8(2); Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 241(3); Criminal 
Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, section 10(1). 
35
 M v D [1998] 3 IR 175, at 178 per Moriarty J.  
36
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 2, and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 245A (as inserted by 
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, section 98). 
37
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 3.  
38
 In R (Director of Assets Recovery Agency) v He and Chen [2004] EWHC 3021, at [77]-[79], Collins J 
rejected the claim that in an application to discharge or vary under section 251(3) the test to be applied was 
not that of a “good arguable case”. In Szepietowski, note 33 at [26], the Court of Appeal stressed that it 
must be established by a good arguable case that a certain kind of unlawful conduct occurred and that 
property was obtained though that kind of unlawful conduct.  
39
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, sections 245A(5) and 246(5). 
40
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 4.  
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parties.
41
 A disposal order deprives the respondent of his rights in the property and 
transfers the property to the Minister for Finance.
42
 In England and Wales, if the High 
Court is satisfied that the property is recoverable (ie obtained through unlawful 
conduct
43
) it must make a recovery order.
44
  
 In New Zealand, civil orders under the 2009 Act may be subdivided into restraint 
and forfeiture orders. Crucially, and in contrast to Ireland, restraint of property is not 
necessary before forfeiture.
45
 A restraining order may be made (with or without notice to 
the respondent
46
) in relation to “tainted” property acquired as a result of or derived from 
significant criminal activity, requiring that it is not to be disposed of, or dealt with, other 
than is provided for in the order.
47
 Such an order lasts for one year, or until the making or 
declining of a forfeiture order, whichever is earlier.
48
 Subpart 3 deals with civil forfeiture 
orders, which are made upon application by the Commissioner of Police to the High 
Court. The Court must make an asset forfeiture order if satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities that the property is tainted,
49
 resulting in the property being vested in the 
Crown and in the custody and control of the Official Assignee. Subsequently, the Official 
Assignee must dispose of the property and use the money to recoup costs, to pay the 
Legal Services Agency any amount of legal aid granted to the former interest holder, and 
to pay any other outstanding fees; the remainder is paid to the Crown.
50
 This disposal 
occurs six months after the time for bringing any appeal against the assets forfeiture order 
expires, if no appeal has been filed; or 6 months after all appeals in respect of the assets 
forfeiture order have been withdrawn or finally determined. Although section 10 provides 
that these appeals are civil proceedings, there is no elucidation in the 2009 Act as to the 
relevant procedure in bringing an appeal.  
                                                 
41
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 4A, as inserted by Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005, 
section 7. 
42
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 4(4).  
43
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 304(1). 
44
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 266(1). The respondent in Director of the Assets Recovery Agency v 
Prince [2006] EWHC 1080 (Admin); [2006] All ER (D) 205, at [55], could not avail of this section 
because he had not “obtained the recoverable property in good faith” and it would not be “just and 
equitable” to refrain from making a recovery order given his “knowledge of the provenance of the funds”.  
45
 Section 11.   
46 Subpart 2. 
47
 Section 25.  
48
 Section 37. 
49
 Section 50. 
50
 Section 82. 
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In addition, a profit forfeiture order may be made which focuses on the benefits accrued 
from significant criminal activity, and the level of this is determined by the High Court.
51
 
Foreign restraining orders and foreign forfeiture orders may also be made under the NZ 
legislation.
52
 
 Despite its notable absence in the New Zealand legislation, the aforementioned 
Proceeds of Crime Acts provide explicitly for the payment of compensation: in Ireland, 
the Minister for Finance compensates for any loss incurred by the owner where he shows 
that the property is not the proceeds of crime
53
 thereby ensuring that injustice is not 
perpetrated against meritorious respondents,
54
 and in England and Wales, the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) reimburses an applicant who has suffered loss as a 
result of an interim order where the property is not decided by the court to be 
recoverable.
55
 This is a crucial counterpoint to the civil powers accorded to the state in 
this context, but there is no reported case involving the payment of compensation to an 
individual in Ireland, England or Wales.  
 
Challenges to civil forfeiture 
 
The location of asset forfeiture in the civil realm, with the attendant lower standard of 
proof and a marked absence of protective rights for the individual, has prompted 
challenges on essentially two main grounds: that forfeiture infringes the right to private 
property, and that it is a criminal process which merely purports to be civil in nature. 
While these arguments have been rejected in domestic courts,
56 
this article now posits 
that the latter claim, that forfeiture is criminal in nature, is well-founded, in particular 
when certain aspects of the Irish and New Zealand models are noted.   
                                                 
51
 Section 52 et seq.  
52
 Subpart 8. A foreign forfeiture order means an order, made under the law of a foreign country by any 
court or other judicial authority, for the forfeiture of property that is tainted property in respect of an 
offence against the law of that country (section 2, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992 No 86). 
53
 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section 16.  
54
 M v D, note 35, at 178 per Moriarty J.   
55
 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 283. 
56
 M v D, note 35; Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 IR 185 (SC); Raimondo v Italy, 12954/87, 
22 February 1994; McIntosh, Petitioner (2001) SC (PC) 89; United States v One Assortment of 89 Firearms 
(1984) 465 US 354; United States v Ursery (1996) 518 US 267. 
 10 
 In concluding that it is not a criminal process or punishment, courts portray asset 
forfeiture as an in rem, rather than in personam, action: 
It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to legal fiction, held 
guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and 
insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is 
proceeded against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the 
punishment for the criminal offense.
57
 
 
Moreover, the Irish and English courts cite numerous “indicia” of crimes in rejecting the 
argument that asset forfeiture is criminal in nature:
 crimes are “offences against the 
community at large” which attract a punitive sanction and which require mens rea; they 
involve detention, search, charge, bail and the possible imposition of a pecuniary penalty 
with liability to imprisonment if the penalty is not paid.
58
 Criminal proceedings “involve 
a formal accusation made on behalf of the state or by a private prosecutor that a 
defendant has committed a breach of the criminal law, and the state or the private 
prosecutor has instituted proceedings which may culminate in the conviction and 
condemnation of the defendant”.59 Applying these criteria, forfeiture procedures were 
deemed not to have “the features of a criminal prosecution”.60 Thus, the courts have held, 
using somewhat circular logic, that a procedure is not a criminal process if it does not 
involve characteristics such as arrest or detention. However, it appears that it is the 
avoidance of these aspects at the stage of enactment which facilitates the depiction of 
forfeiture as civil. For example, while the lack of detention under the Proceeds of Crime 
Acts may be cited as evidence that the proceedings are not criminal, the initial 
classification of the process as civil in nature by the legislature has resulted in the fact 
that an individual may not be detained.  
                                                 
57
 Various Items of Personal Property v United States (1931) 282 US 577. at 581 per Sutherland J. See 
Hansard (HC), Vol.373, col.761 (30 October 2001); Hansard (HL), Vol.635, col.72 (13 May 2002); also 
Green, note 33, at [25]; Director of Assets Recovery Agency v Walsh [2005] NICA 6, at para.41. 
58
 Melling v O’Mathghamhna [1962] IR 1 (SC). 
59
 Customs and Excise Commissioners v City of London Magistrates Court [2000] 4 All ER 763, at 767. 
60
 Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau, note 56, at 217; Murphy v GM, note 5, at 147; Director of the Assets 
Recovery Agency v Customs and Excise Commissioners and Charrington [2005] EWCA Civ 334, at 
para.17; Walsh, note 57, at 23. 
 11 
 Reliance was also placed on the civil categorisation of forfeiture in circumstances 
such as tax evasion. In Ireland, proceedings for the forfeiture of goods which had been 
illegally exported from the state were not seen to constitute a criminal procedure which 
required the safeguards of due process, despite the need to establish that an individual 
committed a criminal offence before forfeiture.
61
 Similarly, the penalty for failure to 
make tax returns was found to be a deterrent or incentive and not a criminal sanction, 
because, besides the provision of a penalty, none of the characteristics of a criminal 
offence were present.
62
 And in the English domestic setting, proceedings concerning the 
evasion of import duty were not deemed criminal because the usual consequences of a 
criminal conviction did not flow from them: there was no conviction or finding of guilt; 
the person condemned was not treated as having a conviction, and he was not subject to 
any other penalty.
63
 This approach was followed subsequently, despite the acknowledged 
severity of the repercussions for the individual in question.
64
 This jurisprudence is also 
influenced by European Court of Human Rights decisions, such as Allgemeine Gold- und 
Silberscheideanstalt v United Kingdom where the forfeiture of items of a third party 
which affected the applicants, subsequent to criminal prosecution, did not render the 
proceedings a “criminal charge”, and Air Canada v United Kingdom, where seizure of an 
aeroplane and its return on payment of a fine was not a criminal charge, given that the 
criminal courts were not involved and failure to pay would not result in criminal 
proceedings.
65
 These cases were relied upon to conclude that “legislation providing for 
forfeiture is not necessarily criminal in nature.”66 
Notwithstanding this weighty line of jurisprudence in the British and European 
contexts, it will now be argued that a number of characteristics indicate that forfeiture, as 
recently introduced by the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009, is actually a criminal 
sanction by another name which should therefore attract due process rights: namely, the 
                                                 
61
 AG v Southern Industrial Trust Limited (1957) 94 ILTR 161, at 167 (HC) (SC). 
62
 McLoughlin v Tuite [1989] IR 82 (SC). 
63
 Goldsmith v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2001] EWHC Admin 285. 
64
 R (Mudie) v Dover Magistrates’ Court [2003] EWCA Civ 237; Gora v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners [2003] EWCA Civ 525; [2004] QB 93, at paras.34-35. 
65
 Allgemeine Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 1; Air Canada v United 
Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 150. 
66
 Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau, note 56, at 223. Murphy v GM, note 5, at 153.   
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centrality of culpability, the promotion of the traditional objectives of punishment, and 
the immense power of the relevant agencies.  
   
Centrality of culpability  
  
The courts in Ireland and England have viewed the absence of a mens rea requirement, 
amongst other factors, as indicating that forfeiture is civil in nature, as the focus purports 
to be on the property rather than the person. However, as Joel Bishop observed in 1858,  
[D]isguise the matter as we may, under whatever form of words, if the intent 
which the owner of the property carries in his bosom is the gist of the thing on 
which the forfeiture turns, then the question is one of the criminal law, and 
forfeiture is a penalty imposed for crime.
67
  
 
Given that allegedly criminal behaviour is at the core of forfeiture, the intention of the 
individual seems pivotal. Evidence that the assets were accrued as a result of criminal 
activity or conduct is required before an order is made, and although the court does not 
need to establish to the criminal standard of proof that the respondent is responsible for 
criminal behaviour or for a specific offence, the blameworthiness of the respondent 
remains fundamental to the forfeiture of assets in what is essentially an “indirect finding 
of guilt”.68 
 The presence of what is described in US jurisprudence as an “innocent owner” 
defence may substantiate this contention.
69
 In Ireland, orders under sections 3 and 4 of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 may not be imposed or may be lifted if there is a serious 
risk of injustice, a caveat which is comparable to an innocent owner defence, for if a 
person can prove that he was unaware of the criminal origins of property, he may retain 
the assets and have the order lifted. Moreover, the logic behind the seven-year waiting 
period before a disposal order could be granted under section 4 (as it originally was 
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enacted
70
) was to ensure that any person who owned property jointly with an individual 
who was allegedly involved in criminal activity or conduct would have the opportunity to 
make a claim that the property was his, rather than belonging to the individual appearing 
to be the owner.  
 Similarly, in England and Wales, a bona fide exception exists, in that a recovery 
order must not be made if it would not be just and equitable to do so, due to the 
respondent having obtained the property in good faith and without notice that it was 
recoverable, and his having taken steps in this regard which he otherwise would not have 
taken.
71
 Also, a victim of theft may apply for an order that the property obtained by 
unlawful conduct was not recoverable (that is, not obtained through unlawful conduct
72
) 
prior to it being taken from the owner.
73
 This suggests that the focus of the order is not 
the property, but rather the allegedly culpable individual, thereby refuting the contention 
that the orders are in rem. In other words, guilt appears to be an issue in the context of 
forfeiture, given that individuals who are perceived to be innocent are treated differently 
to those suspected to be guilty. Indeed, a comment of the Attorney General betrays this 
sentiment:  
If, in a criminal trial, the prosecution cannot prove that the person before the court 
is in fact guilty … then he is entitled to be acquitted. Yet it is as plain as a 
pikestaff that his money has been acquired as the proceeds of crime.
74
  
 
 Section 66 of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 requires the High Court 
to make an order for relief from civil forfeiture order where the person has proven on the 
balance of probabilities that she has an interest in the property and has not unlawfully 
benefited from the relevant significant criminal activity. Moreover, property may be 
excluded from a forfeiture order because of undue hardship, and the decision is taken on 
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various grounds including the nature and extent of the respondent’s interest in the 
property; and the circumstances of the significant criminal activity to which the order 
relates.
75
 So, while mens rea need not be established as occurs in convention criminal 
trials, the focus on the allegedly criminal behaviour and on the culpability of the 
individual results in a de facto finding of guilt, suggesting that the process serves the 
purposes of the criminal law.  
 
Promotion of the Aims of Punishment  
 
Civil forfeiture promotes punishment’s traditional aims of condemnation, retribution and 
deterrence, and so should be viewed as a criminal process. In opposition to this claim, it 
may be argued that the legislation merely seeks to redress an imbalance by seizing assets 
accrued as a result of criminal activity, and therefore is regulatory in nature. As 
McGuinness J observed in the Irish High Court in Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau, the 
removal of the proceeds of crime “could well be viewed in the light of reparation rather 
than punishment or penalty.”76 Civil forfeiture may also be defended on the basis that it is 
analogous to a civil suit for the return of illegally obtained property. In the same way that 
a civil action for misappropriation of property seeks to restore the injured party to the 
position he was in prior to the commission of the tort, it is arguable that civil forfeiture 
also seeks to return the state of affairs to that before the alleged criminal offence. 
 However, this reparative argument is rebutted by the fact that the acting party in 
this instance is the state, with its vast resources and agents, characteristics which 
necessitate counterbalancing due process rights in the criminal context. Various 
safeguards are granted to the accused throughout investigation and at the pre-trial stage of 
criminal process “as a compensation for the unequal start in producing cases”.77 Given 
that “the virtually limitless resources of government investigators”78 are also available to 
the state in the context of asset forfeiture, the same due process rights should accrue to 
the individual on the basis that the process is not merely regulatory in character. In 
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particular, the definition of “proceeds of crime” in Ireland extends beyond mere profit 
from crime to encompass any property received at any time as a result of or in connection 
with the commission of an offence, and hence seems to surpass a purely remedial or 
reparative approach.
79
 Political commentary supports this robust approach: the “ultimate 
aim is not to seize the profits of drug trafficking: it is to put drug traffickers out of 
business altogether.”80 Moreover, a previous Irish Minister for Justice, John 
O’Donoghue, spoke of the “outstanding performance and success” of the process in 
hitting “the drugs barons and other serious criminals where it hurts most – in their 
pockets, bank accounts, fancy houses and fast cars”.81 A more circumscribed definition is 
in place in England and Wales, where the property must have been obtained through 
unlawful conduct. However, the Home Office in 2007 suggested the broadening of the 
English scheme to include property retained or obtained by or in connection with 
unlawful conduct,
82
 bringing the definition in line with that in Ireland, and thereby 
rendering it more susceptible to challenge on the ground that it reaches beyond a remedial 
measure. The definition of “tainted property” in the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 
2009 echoes the broader Irish approach, and means “any property that has, wholly or in 
part, been (i) acquired as a result of significant criminal activity; or (ii) directly or 
indirectly derived from significant criminal activity”.83 Although the interpretation of 
derivation has yet to be unpacked, it appears that the New Zealand measures also 
promotes the aims of punishment by targeting a range of property that is linked, even 
indirectly, with significant criminal activity, lending weight to the claim that the process 
is criminal in nature, if not in name. This desire for de facto retribution is encapsulated in 
the comment that “What really does hurt them is when their nest egg is taken away”.84  
 Furthermore, the view in Ireland regarding the mixing of “legitimate” property 
with the proceeds of crime indicates that the process is more than remedial. The mixing 
of property is dealt with explicitly in England and Wales in section 306(2) of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which provides that the portion of the mixed property 
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which is attributable to the recoverable property represents the property obtained through 
unlawful conduct. This somewhat circular definition implies that the recoverable section 
of mixed property may be separated and thereafter thus recovered.
85
 In contrast, no 
mention is made of “mixed” property in the Irish legislation, and it seems likely that 
mixing of funds would not necessarily preclude the granting of an order, unless it would 
cause a serious risk of injustice.
86
 Indeed, when the issue was raised before a 
Parliamentary Committee in 2004, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 
Michael McDowell, responded sardonically that  
[o]ne could not possibly have a system whereby if a person proved that an aunt 
gave him or her a fiver which was invested in a mansion the person built, it 
therefore ceased to be the proceeds of crime because a tiny fraction of it was a 
voluntary gift from an aunt.
87
  
 
Therefore it appears that assets acquired by a combination of legitimate and illegitimate 
funds may be the subject of an order under the Irish Act, although the issue has not yet 
been considered by the courts. Similarly, section 5 of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) 
Act 2009 has followed the Irish methodology by defining tainted property as any 
property that has been acquired as a result of, or directly or indirectly derived from, more 
than one activity if at least one is a significant criminal activity. Thus, unlike the English 
measure which allows for division of property, the New Zealand provision may result in 
the restraint or forfeiture of all of property despite the valid origins of part of it. The 
potential for harsh consequences in the Irish and New Zealand legislation indicates that 
the more tempered English approach in this respect is preferable. 
 In addition, civil forfeiture fulfils punishment’s aims of censure and 
incapacitation. As HLA Hart contends, criminal sanctions “take their character as 
punishment from the condemnation which precedes them and serve as the warrant for 
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their infliction”.88 “Blaming” distinguishes criminal from civil measures, with the former 
connoting “should not do”,89 and indeed it seems that forfeiture does represent “an 
instance of the use of state power to condemn or punish individuals for wrongdoing”.90 
Certainly, moral responsibility and social blame accrues as a result of judicial 
determination that property represents the proceeds of crime,
91
 and in the New Zealand 
Parliament emphasis was placed on “sending a message [that] …[w]e will not tolerate 
that sort of behaviour”.92 Moreover, although forfeiture does not incapacitate offenders in 
the sense of imprisonment by removing individuals from society, it does seek to 
incapacitate criminal organisations and “reduce their power and influence” by “divesting 
major criminals of their ill-gotten gains”.93   
Asset recovery also seems to display deterrent aims and effects, thus fulfilling one 
of the traditional aims of punishment. While it has been contended that it does not serve 
as a deterrent because it merely recoups what was not legitimately owned and therefore 
does not render the individual any worse off than before the criminal conduct,
94
 the 
seizure of alleged criminal earnings arguably is a general deterrent (insofar as anything 
can be such) as it removes one of the major incentives to commit unlawful behaviour. 
Asset forfeiture may also serve as a specific deterrent to the individual whose property 
has been seized and retained, as is exemplified by this observation:  
Criminals are on the run as never before. They have gone to ground overseas and 
elsewhere because their assets are being seized and their ill gotten gains, their 
motivation for committing crime, are being taken from them.
95
 
 
Such commentary underlines the intent of policy-makers that forfeiture ought to serve 
deterrent ends. 
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Power of the agencies involved in civil forfeiture  
 
Finally, it seems that the expansive powers enjoyed and exercised by the relevant 
agencies in Ireland, England and New Zealand suggest the need for protective due 
process rights to accrue to the targeted individual. Both the Criminal Assets Bureau 
(CAB) in Ireland and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in England and 
Wales possess significant abilities which pit the might of the state against the individual, 
although certain elements of the Irish system are more problematic. Moreover, the 
Commissioner of Police is responsible for taking civil restraint and forfeiture applications 
in New Zealand, and this link with the police indicates, on the face of it, a need for 
protective rights.   
 In a structural sense, the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau represents a hybrid of State 
agencies and authorities, including members of the police, officials of the Revenue 
Commissioners and of the Department of Social, Community and Family Affairs.
96
 A 
person who holds such dual positions retains the powers or duties that accrue from his 
original role, when carrying out CAB business.
97
 A Bureau officer may impart 
information to other Bureau officers, members of the police, the Revenue Commissioners 
and the Department of Social, Family and Community Affairs to fulfil their respective 
functions,
98
 and may receive and act upon information received from the Bureau.
99
 
Indeed, as was observed in CAB v Craft, members are not only entitled to exchange 
information but would be in dereliction of their duty if they failed to do so,
100
 and this 
“joined-up” way of working was praised explicitly by the English Attorney-General in 
the House of Lords.
101
 In addition to the fact that many CAB staff are members of the 
police force, an officer from each police division is trained as a “criminal asset profiler” 
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to gather information at a local level and indicate possible foci for the Bureau’s work.102 
This illustrates the unmistakeable connections between the police and CAB in Ireland and 
undermines the contention that the process serves merely civil aims. 
 The objectives of CAB are the identification of assets, wherever situated, which 
derive or are suspected to derive from criminal activity; the taking of action to deprive 
persons of such assets; and the carrying out of investigations in relation to such 
proceedings.
103
 CAB has “not inconsiderable powers of investigation”104 and may initiate 
investigations and other actions on its own motion, without need for external referral or 
recommendation.
105
 A bureau officer who is a member of police not below the rank of 
superintendent may issue search warrants in circumstances of urgency, and production 
orders may be granted to make material available to members of CAB.
106
  
 In England and Wales, the Assets Recovery Agency (introduced by Part 1 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) implemented civil recovery procedure, drawing on the 
recommendations of the Home Office and the Attorney-General, who referred to the 
example of CAB.
107
 However, while the interaction of many bodies in the Irish context is 
viewed as a strength, the potential for disjointed effort by a hybrid agency was 
highlighted by the Home Office in 2004,
108
 a fear which seems to have been borne out, 
given the low levels of assets recovered by ARA, its inability to meet self-financing 
targets and “basic failures” in management practice.109 Moreover, ARA required a 
referral from a relevant police agency before acting in relation to proceeds of crime, in 
contrast to CAB. ARA’s Director was obliged to exercise his functions “in the way which 
he considers is best calculated to contribute to the reduction of crime”,110 having regard 
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to guidance given by the Secretary of State.
111
 Such guidance given in 2005 stressed that 
the Director should not normally act without a referral from law enforcement or 
prosecution authorities and should consult to ensure criminal investigation or proceedings 
are not prejudiced.
112
 This limited ARA’s effect, given that less than 20 per cent of the 
relevant bodies had so referred cases by the end of August 2006.
113
 While ARA’s 
Director supported this feature on the basis that it safeguarded the requirement that the 
agency be satisfied about “why criminal conviction has not been possible or feasible”,114 
it undoubtedly lessened its effectiveness, thereby contributing, at least in part, to its 
demise.  
 ARA was abolished by the Serious Crime Act 2007, and its civil recovery and 
other functions transferred to the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
115
 Although 
SOCA has been described as “an immensely powerful statutory body”116 it remains 
dependent on external referral before initiating investigation or proceedings relating to 
asset recovery, and this characteristic differentiates it from its Irish equivalent. However, 
once SOCA receives such information it possesses similar powers to CAB concerning 
production order applications
117
 and the disclosure of information.
118
 Furthermore, 
interim orders allow for the appointment of an interim receiver with “very wide 
powers”119 including search and seizure, the production of information, and taking 
appropriate steps to secure the preservation of the property.
120
  
 In New Zealand, there is no separate agency with responsibility for the taking of 
civil restraint or forfeiture actions; rather such tasks are subsumed within the remit of the 
Commissioner of Police. Subpart 7 of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act 2009 
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contains the provisions concerning the relevant investigative powers. While warrants and 
production orders may be issued for the purposes of investigations under the 2009 Act, 
this is only by a District or a High Court Judge upon application by the Commissioner.
121
 
An examination order may be made which requires attendance before the Commissioner 
and production of documents. This approach is more cognisant of the dangers inherent in 
CAB or police officers issuing warrants themselves. CAB, SOCA and the New Zealand 
police force possess considerable powers concerning the entry of premises, the 
production of property and the investigation of suspected possession of “criminal” assets, 
implying that due process rights should accrue to the targeted individual. Indeed, the 
ability of CAB to initiate proceedings independently, its issuance of its own warrants, and 
the linkage with the police force in Ireland and New Zealand add further weight to this 
contention.  
 
A Middle Ground Compromise?   
 
The proposition that certain characteristics of asset forfeiture render it criminal in nature 
has not convinced the courts in any jurisdiction. A markedly consequentialist thinking 
permeates judicial and political debate on the issue, which stresses the substantial 
detriment to forfeiture proceedings if due process norms were held to apply.
122
 Any 
criticism of the process is cited as evidence of an “ulterior motive”, as being “soft on 
crime”, and as “more interested in the civil liberties of drug dealers and criminals than in 
helping the Government to defend communities”.123 So, given that the extant 
jurisprudence and political discourse demonstrates due process norms will not accrue to 
respondents in such circumstances, perhaps the best that can be hoped is for an 
intermediate approach.  
The adoption of such a methodology could take the form of maintaining the 
process in the civil courts but requiring a higher standard of proof than the balance of 
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probabilities; such “middle ground” jurisprudence has been identified in the US.124 
Indeed, an intermediate approach was adopted in England and Wales in the context of 
hearings for anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOS) under the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998. In R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester the House of Lords found that 
although the ASBO process was a civil and preventative one which did not involve a 
charge, conviction or criminal record, 
125
 the seriousness of the matter necessitated 
satisfaction of the criminal standard of proof. Similarly, the forfeiture of assets may be 
convincingly portrayed as fitting into what Kenneth Mann terms a “punitive civil 
sanctions” framework, which would warrant the adoption of proper procedural 
protections.
126
 This characterisation of forfeiture would thus demand that certain rights 
would accrue to the individual, such as the presumption of innocence, to silence 
throughout the course of the proceedings, to legal representation, to test the evidence 
against him, and to trial by jury. 
However, in R (Director of Assets Recovery Agency) v He and Chen Collins J 
considered the submission that the determination of what amounts to criminal conduct in 
recovery proceedings requires the top end of the “scale of probabilities”, equivalent to the 
criminal standard. He concluded that while the court should look for  
cogent evidence before deciding that the balance of probabilities has been met … 
Parliament deliberately referred to the balance of probabilities, and … the court 
should not place a gloss upon it, so as to require that the standard approaches that 
appropriate in a criminal case.
127
  
 
This rejection of counsel’s argument demonstrates a noteworthy degree of deference to 
the legislature in a situation with such repercussions for individual rights,
128
 and results in 
an unambiguous dismissal of a “middleground” compromise.  
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Conclusion  
 
Civil forfeiture allows the might of the state and the opprobrium of the community to be 
visited upon individuals who are believed to transgress the criminal law but who have 
otherwise evaded prosecution, thereby using a civil mechanism to serve the ends of the 
criminal process. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that asset forfeiture will be dislodged from 
its position in the Irish and English legal topography, given the political and popular 
support for it, and indeed the recent introduction of the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) 
Act 2009 in New Zealand demonstrates the permeation of this tactic worldwide. The Irish 
Minister for Justice, John O’Donoghue, has spoken of “the outstanding performance and 
success of the Criminal Assets Bureau”,129 and this sentiment is echoed in the resounding 
popular and political support for civil recovery in England and Wales which stood at 85 
per cent in 2007.
130
  
A facet of the English model which stimulates the vigorous pursuit of civil asset 
recovery and may explain its popularity is “incentivisation”, drawing on the considerable 
revenue-producing capacity of asset recovery. The “Recovered Assets Incentivisation 
Fund” distributes half of the assets recovered to the agencies involved to improve asset 
recovery and local crime fighting priorities,
131
 and in 2007 police forces received £17m 
from the recoveries made.
132
 Furthermore, assets recovered in England and Wales are 
allocated to community projects administered by the Home Office.
133
 In addition, ARA 
was given detailed targets regarding recovery and a comprehensive business plan,
134
 
while SOCA’s most recent annual plan speaks of “strategic imperatives” with “planned 
deliverables”, measures and outputs, including the tackling of criminal finance and 
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profits through asset recovery.
135
 These factors may betray the underlying rationales for 
the process, and the imposition of fiscal targets poses a challenge to the administration of 
justice, as it focuses on the revenue-producing capacity of forfeiture to the potential 
detriment of equity or fairness.
136
     
 The Irish Parliament may make monies available for the purpose of expenditure 
by the Bureau in the performance of its functions, but this funding is not dependent on 
the revenue confiscated or forfeited by CAB, nor does it represent a proportion of the 
property seized.
137
 As regards the use of recovered assets, the Select Committee 
recommended in 1985 that the agency established to examine and trace assets of 
suspected drug dealers (which took the form of CAB) should eventually be funded from 
the proceeds of confiscation orders.
138
 The “ring-fencing” of assets “for those 
communities who have suffered most at the hands of the drug barons” was also mooted 
when the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Bill 2003 was debated, but rejected by the 
Irish Government.
139
 Nevertheless, the capacity of CAB to generate money for the 
Exchequer augments its popular and political support:
140
 each year millions of euros’ 
worth of property are subject to interim and interlocutory orders, with €2,002,738.41 
disposed of in 2005, €3,221585.14 in 2006, and €1,435,340.59 in 2007.141 
 Civil forfeiture holds the potential to usurp ordinary police work, as a softer 
option to the normal and more onerous investigative and prosecution process.
142
 This 
indicates the importance of the statutory provision in the English Proceeds of Crime Act 
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2002 regarding the priority to be given to criminal prosecutions.
143
 No such priority is 
contained in the Irish or New Zealand statutes, although the Deputy Commissioner of the 
Irish police stressed that civil forfeiture operates in parallel to the normal investigating 
procedures of the police,
144
 rather than as an alternative. Despite these intentions, it 
appears that asset forfeiture is increasingly the preferred tactic in combating serious 
crime, given the relative ease with which such orders may be granted, when contrasted 
with the prosecution and conviction of crime. Such political and popular support, 
combined with the generation of funds for the public purse and economic factors, and 
judicial approval in the English, Irish and European contexts, indicate that this process 
will continue to be a key weapon in states’ arsenals against organised and serious crime.  
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